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Summary: The tax neutrality principle was defined as a tax system not 
influencing the taxpayers’ business decisions. Economists usually use ‘the 
no tax world’ as the baseline to decide if a specific tax measure is ‘neutral. 
If a taxpayer’s reaction to a specific tax is the same as if there is no such 
tax, then it is neutral. Such formulation of tax neutrality is inappropriate to 
evaluate taxation in a regional market as European Union. This paper estab-
lishes a new normative framework for evaluating the EU corporate tax law 
reform project, the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
Proposal, that aims to properly tax MNE taxpayers’ cross-border income by 
a pre-decided formula. The tax neutrality principle should be not be based 
on the no-tax baseline but interpreted as ‘faithfully reflecting the taxpayers’ 
economic activities throughout EU’. EU Member States should maintain 
proper fiscal autonomy to decide their actual administration inputs (the 
public benefit provided) and their own method to implement the EU level 
corporate group taxation (the subsidiarity principle). This trio-formulated 
neutrality concept falls between Rawls’ liberalism theory and Nozick’s 
libertarianism theory, closer to Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s tax jus-
tice theory. Such trio-combination also better regulates the interactions of 
the three actors in the EU internal market: EU, Member States and MNE 
taxpayers. This reformed neutrality is a more appropriate norm than one 
single economic or legal principle for the EU corporate tax reform.
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1. Introduction
What criterion is desirable to evaluate a corporate taxation system, especially in the 
context of regional integration, such as European Union, is a difficult puzzle. The 
puzzling points are multiple-folded. First, a corporate income tax system itself as 
such is disputed for resulting in economic double taxation to shareholders. Corpo-
rations can conduct economic activities much more extensively than individuals, 
but they are legal fictions and still owned and managed by natural persons. It has 
been long argued that corporate income tax is redundant or unnecessary double 
taxation in relation to shareholders’ personal income tax. Second, in the European 
Union context, corporate income tax is the sensitive area and is rarely harmonized. 
Member States’ fiscal autonomy on corporate tax is still quite extensive, even sub-
ject to the internal market mandate. The consequence of maintaining such fiscal 
autonomy is tricky: on the one hand, Member States compete with each other to 
attract corporations’ economic activities and capital into their jurisdictions so there 
is a concern of ‘racing to the bottom’; on the other hand, disparities of national 
tax laws have resulted in enormous compliance costs and provided aggressive 
tax planning opportunities for multinational enterprises (MNEs). OECD’s Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project has revealed many problems caused by 
MNEs. Third, corporate income tax on MNEs’ cross-border economic activities, 
will directly involve allocating taxing powers between Member States. In other 
words, EU tax law will have to deal with the relation between EU and its Member 
States; the relation between MNE taxpayers and involved Member States; and the 
relation between Member States with each other.
To seek a desirable normative framework to evaluate a corporate taxation 
system under the EU law, a reformed framework or principle would be needed. 
This is why I decide to review critically one of the most accepted1 norms for the 
tax law and policy: ‘tax neutrality’. Tax neutrality has been discussed widely in 
the context of international tax law and policy as well as EU tax harmonization. 
Since the mid-20th century, Economists and tax academics have developed var-
ious different meanings of neutrality: Capital Export Neutrality (CEN), Capital 
Import Neutrality (CIN), Capital Ownership Neutrality (CON), Market Neutrali-
ty (MN). Each type of ‘neutrality’ represents a specific policy goal, and therefore 
there is no hierarchy between them. When it comes to corporate group taxation 
at EU level, i.e. CCCTB, it has been argued that CEN, CIN and MN should all 
be achieved at the same time. In this regard, it is not crystal clear how and what 
1 WEISBACH, D. A The Use of Neutralities in International Tax Policy, University of Chicago 
Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 697 (2014) [online]. Available 
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2482624, accessed 14 March 2019.
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‘neutrality’ should be as the normative framework to design a fair tax formulary 
apportionment system for EU and Member States.
The research question of this paper is: what does and should neutrality mean to 
the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) under the EU tax law and 
how political philosophical ideas of ‘justice’ evaluate CCCTB and lead to similar or 
different policy options. In the field of tax law and policy, economics have played an 
active role as the analytical tool, whereas the political philosophy has not influenced 
quite much. When it comes to ideas such as ‘justice’ or ‘legitimacy’ or ‘fairness’, the 
design of a tax policy or system can be comprehensively and convincing when we 
also incorporate the discipline of philosophy.2 Therefore I also explore the justice 
ideas developed by representative political philosophers and focus on these philos-
ophers’ (possible) responses to the options of the CCCTB Directive.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the different defini-
tion of ‘neutrality’ in the different contexts and the neutrality derived from the 
CCCTB Directive Proposal. There are quite a few neutrality principles and each 
principle is related to a specific policy goal, including capital import, capital 
export, capital ownership or market participants’ competition; in many cases, 
neutrality is the synonym of non-discrimination, such as the ‘fiscal neutrality’ in 
the VAT discussions. It seems that none of these formulations can demonstrate 
the neutrality norm that pursued by EU harmonization on direct taxation. Under 
the discussion of establishing an EU internal market, the tax neutrality principle 
should not only be understood as pursuing the goal of efficiency but also taking 
into account the subsidiarity principle and the benefits principle. The Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) Proposal is an example that the 
neutrality principle should be understood broadly as ‘not causing distortions to 
taxpayers’ economic decisions’ and ‘reflecting economic reality’. CCCTB has 
a broad scope of harmonization in order to pursue a more integrated internal mar-
ket, and at the same time it also aims to tax multinationals’ pan-EU cross-border 
activities in a predictable and less manipulative manner; CCCTB is also expected 
to allocate Member States’ taxing powers fairly. Such tax neutrality principle 
under CCCTB, is not limited to any international tax neutrality principle in the 
narrow-sense, and it is inevitably overlapping with inter-nation equity.
Section 3 will discuss justice ideas of three schools of thoughts: John Rawls’ 
liberalism and Nozick’s libertarianism and Liam Murphy& Thomas Nagel’s tax 
justice theory and examine CCCTB against these theories. Generally speaking, 
these three schools of thoughts all justify adopting CCCTB. The neutrality that 
2 The research approach of this paper is inspired by two books: MURPHY, L., NAGEL, T. The 
Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 1–228; 
BHANDARI, M. (ed.). Philosophical Foundations of Tax Law, 2017, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p.1–320. 
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CCCTB pursues, however, falls between Nozick and Rawls and also matches 
Murphy& Nagel’s idea.
Section 4 further discusses two specific policy options that CCCTB choos-
es: un-harmonized tax rate/free tax rate competition and the three-factor shar-
ing formula. In the specific option level, these three schools of thoughts would 
lead to different choices. I will explain these differences and argue that, a broad 
definition of the neutrality principle that uses the well-maintained market envi-
ronment as the baseline (not the no-tax world), will support the healthy tax rate 
competition and the sharing formula consisting of production and customers’ 
market side of the market. Section 5 concludes that, abroad-sense neutrality is 
necessary for EU corporate tax law, and it falls between the schools of liberalism 
and libertarianism as it might be close to the tax justice in Murphy& Nagel’s 
idea, though Murphy& Nagel’s has excluded corporation tax and international 
tax from their discussions. There is still an unsolved puzzle regarding the tax 
incidence (i.e. the actual tax burden) but it should be ancillary.
2. The Tax Neutrality Principle Revisited
2.1. The Varied Meaning Of The “Neutrality” Norm
In the development of international tax law, the prominent economist Musgrave 
proposed the concept ‘neutrality’ as a norm, and he distinguishes two types of 
“neutrality”: the capital import neutrality (CIN) and capital export neutrality 
(CEN).3 The neutrality principle mandates that the ideal relation should be be-
tween taxation-imposing sovereign states and capital flow of private businesses, 
as taxpayers. Therefore, in this context the neutrality principle is a negative norm 
for sates: the effect of taxation should ‘not’ discourage taxpayers from conducting 
capital import (i.e. inbound investment) under the capital import neutrality prin-
ciple; taxation should not discourage taxpayers from conducting capital export 
(i.e. outbound investment). The baseline to decide whether a taxation system is 
neutral is to compare with the situation as if there is no-tax levied.4
3 Two aspects of neutrality see MUSGRAVE, R. A. Criteria for Foreign Tax Credit. In: Baker, R. 
Taxation and Operations Abroad. Princeton: Tax Institute, 1960, p. 83–93. Later Peggy Musgrave 
also further writes about the distinction of CEN and CIN. See MUSGRAVE, P. B. Taxation 
of Foreign Investment Income, An Economic Analysis. Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, p.1–140, 
reprinted in MUSGRAVE, P. R. Tax Policy in the Global Economy: Selected Essays of Peggy 
R  Musgrave, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002, p. 1–470.
4 The no-tax as the base line is widely accepted by a lot of scholars, such as SHAHEEN, F. Inter-
national Tax Neutrality: Reconsiderations. Virginia Tax Review, 2007, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 203–239.
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Peggy Musgrave clearly has the preference of CEN over CIN, because she 
sees conducting outbound investment as a measure to maximize the global 
welfare. Musgrave’s neutrality principle has become a well-accepted norm to 
evaluate international tax policies and laws. Both CEN and CIN are adopted by 
different states, out of different policy concerns. Some states have the policy of 
encouraging outbound investment whereas some states have the policy of en-
couraging inbound investment. Conceptually speaking, CEN and CIN are mutual 
exclusive and cannot be achieved simultaneously, unless different sovereign 
states decide to have the identical tax rate.5 This conclusion is actually quite 
obvious, because CEN and CIN describe the different demands for the state: to 
encourage inbound or outbound investment. CEN and CIN are ‘mirror images’6 
to each other; they are interrelated but describe two opposite demands.
Later on, other economists also developed other broader neutrality concepts, 
such as market neutrality (MN), which demands that taxation should let the 
individual participants to compete freely in the market.7 Capital Ownership Neu-
trality (CON), which is derived from CIN, also developed. MN addresses a tax 
system not hindering market participants’ competition and CON focuses on the 
effect of a tax system on capital owners.8
These different neutrality principles do not have hierarchy or superiority, but 
merely describe different policy directions. What these neutrality principles are 
in common is that ‘neutrality’ should be read as the synonym of ‘not negatively 
influence’, and the concept ‘neutrality’ has to be combined with an item that 
should not be negatively influenced by taxation. In other words, the neutrality 
concept in these principles all refers to a narrow meaning, not a broad one.9 We 
5 Different opinion, see Id. Shaheen argues that CEN and CIN can be achieved simultaneously even 
when the tax systems of different sovereign states are not uniformed, as long as the demand of 
CIN is interpreted as capital ownership neutrality, which demands the tax law not to negatively 
influence capital ownership by domestic or foreign owners. For example, Knoll disagrees with 
him and argues that the terminology of CEN and CIN should be re-considered, see KNOLL, M. S. 
Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality, Tax Law Review, 2011, vol. 64, no. 2, p. 99–129.
6 Maarten de Wilde, Sharing the Pie: Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market (IBFD 2017) at 3.2.4.4.
7 This concept of MN is developed and elaborated by Michael P. Devereux, see DEVEREUx, M. P., 
LORETZ, S. Evaluating Neutrality Properties of Corporate Tax Reforms, Oxford University Centre 
for Business Taxation Working Papers no. 1007 (2010). [online]. Available at: https://EconPapers.
repec.org/RePEc:btx:wpaper:1007, accessed 25 March 2019. They argue that, the CCCTB proposal 
could move toward CEN or MN, but adoption of such formulary apportionment system while 
maintaining the differential tax rates, can introduce new distortions and thus still deviate from MN.
8 Capital Ownership Neutrality explanations, see HINES, J. R. Jr. Reconsidering the Taxation of 
Foreign Income. Tax Law Review, 2009, vol. 62, no. 2, p. 269–298.
9 Weisbach observes the variety of ‘neutrality’ principles and indicates that each neutrality concept 
represents a different policy objective. He also argues that these neutralities (in the narrow sense) 
are not useful to establish the criterion of ‘optimal tax’. See Weisbach (n1).
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can also see the similar pattern in the non-discrimination principle: the non-dis-
crimination principle needs to be embodied by including a ‘non-discrimination 
ground’ such as nationality, gender, race, etc. The neutrality principle in the 
economic literature also has to be combined with a ‘neutrality ground’, such as 
capital import, capital export, capital ownership market competition, etc. There-
fore it is quite interesting to show that, these neutrality principles are not ‘neutral’ 
themselves, because each of them has a distinct policy direction. Not negatively 
influencing ‘capital export’ will inevitably influence ‘capital import’; and thus 
a pure neutrality principle does not seem to exist in these discussions. Rothbard 
even proactively argues that neutral taxation is really a myth, and it is just like 
the case that it is impossible to claim ‘money’ is neutral.10 From formulations of 
these tax scholars, the terminology of ‘neutrality’ has multiple meanings in each 
different context. When we need to use the neutrality principle as the norm to 
evaluate a large-scale tax policy which covers more than one objective, it would 
be wise to take a broader definition, not a narrow one.11
In the context of EU tax law development, the neutrality principle has differ-
ent meanings. We can see such variety in the primary law level, the secondary 
law level and Court of Justice’s jurisprudence. In the primary law, the neutrality 
principle, not being mentioned directly but well-recognized by prominent EU tax 
law experts, can be derived from EU’s purpose of pursuing economic efficiency 
and establishing the internal market.12 The rationale of the neutrality principle 
in the internal market is that, Member States’ legislation (as well as EU har-
monization), should pursue the market economy and its efficiency, and so EU 
law, including tax law, should eliminate distortions in the internal market and 
not to give rise to distortions either. Pre-existing distortions might result from 
disparities of national law and thus eliminating such distortions would require 
harmonization. When adopting a new piece of EU law, it should be cautious not 
to create distortions to make the internal market ‘not neutral’.
As to the secondary law, either Directives on direct taxation or indirect taxation 
can provide a comprehensive idea of ‘neutrality’. There are only few Directives har-
monizing direct taxation. Among these Directives regarding direct taxation, CEN and 
CIN are both accepted and sometimes co-exist as equal options. For example, Parent 
10 ROTHBARD, M. N. The Myth of Neutral Taxation. Cato Journal, 1981, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 519–564.
11 Kahn also observes the two meanings of ‘tax neutrality’ co-exist but should both be re-considered. 
He argues that, the narrow meaning of tax neutrality that is against a specific bias due to the 
tax law might not be very useful to have a picture of ‘the ideal tax system’. See KAHN, D. A. 
The Two Faces of Tax Neutrality: Do They Interact or are They Mutually Exclusive? Northern 
Kentucky Law Review, 1990, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 1–18.
12 See discussions on neutrality derived from TFEU Article 110 and Article 120, SCHÖN, W. Neu-
trality and Territoriality – Competing or Converging Concepts in European Tax Law? Bulletin 
for International Taxation, 2015, Vol. 69, no. 4/5, p. 271–293.
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Subsidiary Directive allows Member States to choose the exemption method or the 
deduction method to implement the Directive, so both CEN and CIN are acceptable.13
In the filed of VAT of EU law, VAT fiscal neutrality has another different 
meaning: it is synonym of non-discrimination. The normative content of the 
fiscal neutrality of EU VAT rules, refers to two sub-concepts: (1) VAT should 
be neutral for competition of similar goods and services; (2) VAT levied upon 
similar goods and similar services should not be different whatever the length of 
he production and distribution chain.Fiscal neutrality in VAT especially focuses 
on ensuring non-discrimination between similar goods and services.14
Jurisprudence of Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) does not provide 
a more clear idea regarding tax neutrality either. Court of Justice of European 
Union seems to have an ambition to pursue both CEN and CIN under the EU 
law15, though sometimes the Court randomly turns down CIN or CEN in difference 
cases.16 To achieve both CEN and CIN might look illogical, because CEN and CIN 
are two distinctive demands and it is impossible to eliminate all the disparities of 
Member States’ tax laws. However, if we step back to the fundamental purpose of 
‘establishing’ an internal market in European Union, inbound and outbound flow 
of trade and capital, are equally important. Four fundamental economic freedoms 
under the EU law encourage cross-border activities ‘between’ Member States, and 
thus the distinction between CEN and CIN will naturally disappear, because EU 
law aims to create an internal market. In this regard, a broader sense of neutrality 
that can encompass both CEN and CIN, will be necessary for evaluating EU tax 
law and policy, though the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice European Union 
does not contribute much to the substantial contents of the neutrality principle.17
Being different from economists who create different ‘types’ of neutrality, 
legal scholars have argued that the concept tax neutrality has to be reformed 
especially for evaluating EU law. For example, Vogel has analyzed that tax neu-
trality should not be limited to capital import or capital export, but should be in-
terpreted as taxation should not alter the business decisions and should not cause 
distortions. He described this as ‘cross-border neutrality’.18 As another example, 
13 CERIONI, L. The European Union and Direct Taxation: A Solution for a Difficult Relationship. 
2015, New York: Routledge, p. 1–254, at p. 56.
14 See the general introduction of the concept of VAT neutrality, HERBAIN, A. H. VAT Neutrality. 
Cork: Primento Digital Publishing, 2015, p. 1–235; DE LA FERIA, R. The EU VAT System and the 
Internal Market. Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009, p. 1–382, Ch. 4; OECD VAT/GST Guidelines, 2017.
15 DE WILDE, M. Sharing the Pie: Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market. Amsterdam: IBFD 
2017, p.1–798, at 3.2.2.4, (IBFD 2017).
16 Ibid., a comparison of CJEU’s inconsistent case law on CEN and CIN at 3.2.4.3.
17 Ibid., at 3.2.4.3 (IBFD 2017).
18 Klaus Vogel used ‘cross-border neutrality’ to describe this status. See VOGEL, K. Taxation of 
Cross-border Income, Harmonization, and Tax Neutrality Under European Community Law: 
An Institutional Approach. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer, 1994, p. 1–50.
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Smit also adopts a broader definition: neutrality under EU tax law should mean 
‘being absent from company tax distortions and business decisions are based on 
economic conditions, not on tax law conditions.19 In the context of EU corporate 
tax law, their concepts of neutrality are more general than traditional concepts 
of CEN, CIN or MN. At the end of the day, economists also evaluate a piece of 
legislative proposal by taking into account different types of neutrality principles 
at the same time,20 and legal scholars aim to reform the normative content of the 
neutrality principle.
In addition to pursuing economic efficiency in the market, other fundamental 
principles of EU law, will also play a role to formulate the idea of neutrality. 
European Union has the fundamental purpose to establish an internal market as 
if there are no borders or obstacles. Member States will implement the creation 
and integration process of EU internal market altogether, but Member States 
should not give up their diversity completely. EU law has long recognized 
‘subsidiarity principle’ that regulates the issues that Member States and EU 
share legislative competence. The internal market is the shared competence of 
EU and Member States, and therefore all EU legislation regarding the internal 
market, should comply with the subsidiarity principle. The subsidiarity princi-
ple requires that an issue should be left to Member States to decide in case it 
is still more efficient for Member States to implement. It is EU that bears the 
burden of proof to show that the EU harmonization measure is really necessary 
(the EU added-value test) and proportional (i.e. in the least intrusive way, the 
proportionality test).21 In other words, a EU harmonization measure that aims to 
eliminate completely the disparities is not allowed not only from the perspective 
of political reality but also from the perspective of the general principle of EU 
law. If a harmonization eliminates all the diversities from EU Member States 
for the issues that EU Member States still enjoy competences, such harmoni-
zation would be contrary to the subsidiarity principle and thus unconstitutional 
under the EU law. From the procedural perspective, since 2009 EU law pro-
vides the yellow card procedure22 for national parliaments to review and submit 
19 SMIT, D. EU Freedoms, Non-EU Countries and Company Taxation. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International, 2012, p. 1–898., Ch. 2.
20 For example note 7, Devereux & Loretz adopt and analyze MN and CEN respectively to the 
CCCTB proposal discussions. 
21 There are enormous discussions on the subsidiarity principle under the EU law. In the context of 
discussing the subsidiarity principle regarding creating the internal market, I find Portuese’ work 
useful because he analyzes it from the economic efficiency perspective. See PORTUESE, A. 
Principle of Subsidiarity as Principle of Economic Efficiency. Columbia Journal of European 
Law, 2011, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 231–262. 
22 For example. In: 2011 national parliaments have submitted their opinion about the CCCTB Di-
rective Proposal, and negative opinions are not qualified to precede the yellow-card procedure. 
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their opinion on whether a specific EU legislative proposal is compatible with 
the subsidiarity principle. Therefore, from both the substantial and procedural 
perspectives, the subsidiarity principle is the fundamental principle of EU law 
that both Member States and EU institutions should comply with from the very 
beginning of the legislative process.
Last but not the least, EU tax laws also involve allocating taxing powers 
between Member States. Therefore, the fairness or inter-nation equity23 between 
Member States is also necessary and imperative. Inter-nation equity will also play 
a role the meaning of neutrality. Inter-nation equity means that, the fair relation-
ship between national gain or loss capture between two (or more nations), each 
of which has a connection to a particular gain.’ In the field of international tax 
law, the core issue of inter-nation equity is how taxable income from cross-bor-
der economic activities should be taxed and how different countries involved 
should share such tax. The conflict between the residence taxation and the source 
taxation in the field of international tax law, also belongs to the discussion of 
inter-nation equity. EU tax harmonization has addressed the same issue, i.e. divid-
ing taxing powers between EU Member States reasonably and fairly. Therefore, 
the neutrality under the EU tax law would inevitably overlap with the concept 
of inter-nation equity. The following section will demonstrate this overlapping 
by using the CCCTB Directive Proposal as an example.
2.2. The Neutrality In The Case Of The CCCTB Directive 
Proposal
The CCCTB Directive Proposal aims to harmonize corporate tax and the way of 
allocating the taxing powers of Member States. Therefore it will provide a new 
set of mandatory corporate tax law for MNEs taxpayers above a certain size, and 
replace the current bilateral tax treaties between EU Member States.
See SZUDOCZKY, R. Is the CCCTB Proposal in line with the Principle of Subsidiarity? In: 
Weber, D. (ed.). CCCTB: Selected Issues, Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer, 2012. As Szudoczky 
analyzes, the 13 negative reasoned opinions submitted by parliaments of the Member States, 
have a common feature: these reasoned opinions are formulated as being more similar to 
discuss the proportionality of the element of consolidation of CCCTB Directive Proposal, 
instead of arguing the two tests indicated in the impact assessment. Member States are ar-
guing the same objectives, including eliminating compliance costs from national tax law 
disparities and lowering high transfer-pricing costs, should be achieved in a less intrusive 
way for Member States.
23 Reviews of Musgrave’s idea about intra-nation equity, BROOKS, K. Inter-Nation Equity: The 
Development of an Important but Underappreciated International Tax Value. In: Krever, R., 
Head, J. G. (eds.). Tax Reform In The 21st Century: A Volume in Memory of Richard Musgrave. 
Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009, p. 471–498. 
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By a metaphor of ‘a pie and a knife’, a multinational enterprise (MNE) group 
active in different EU Member States can file their harmonized consolidated 
tax base from all qualifying group members from different EU Member States, 
and such consolidated tax base is like a big pie, jointly contributed by all group 
members; and the formula is like a knife to decide the share/a piece of the pie 
which is apportioned to each group member.
Therefore, each group member’s apportioned share of the taxable pie of the 
whole group, would be calculated as:
The overview of the CCCTB is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Directive Overview
Source: the author
the consolidated tax base×  
( × + × + ×  ) 
the consolidated tax base×  
( × + × + ×  ) 
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This Directive proposal uses a pre-determined “formula” to apportion taxable 
income of MNE taxpayers, and therefore it is abbreviated as Formulary Appor-
tionment (FA). This legislative proposal is a tax reform effort at the EU level 
to provide all EU Member States a uniform consolidated (i.e. group) corporate 
tax base and a formula to divide their taxing powers on multinational enterprise 
(MNE) taxpayers’ income. It would replace the bilateral tax treaties between 
these EU Member States when being adopted. It should be noted that, although 
EU has more than 50 years history, corporate taxation is still rarely harmonized 
by EU legislations. When the CCCTB Directive Proposal is adopted unanimously 
by EU Member States, it would be a milestone also for the EU law development 
as a whole.
Here comes the core question: what should be the normative content of the 
tax neutrality principle in the CCCTB Directive?
As indicated above, different EU law instruments provide different formu-
lations of ‘neutrality’, and it is because each instrument serves its own specific 
purpose and addresses a specific distortion. Therefore, since the CCCTB system 
is a larger-scale harmonization for corporate income tax and has two purposes 
at the same time (eliminating tax obstacles due to national law disparities and 
combating tax avoidance), will need a broad neutrality principle that covers not 
only CIN24 or CEN or cross-border activities’ neutrality and ‘market/competitive’ 
neutrality’ between MNE taxpayers, but also achieving “inter-nation equity/fair-
ness” between Member States in the end. To achieve this fairness, it is essential 
that the CCCTB Directive faithfully represent eligible taxpayers’ “economic 
activities” from the supply/input side (the labour and the asset) as well as the 
demand/output side (the sales), i.e. throughout the supply-consumption chain. 
A tax system that can reflect different types of economic activities conducted by 
MNE taxpayers can also ensure the fairness between different Member States, 
which have different resources and provide different public services. In other 
words, a neutral CCCTB system should especially be reflect and focus on ‘eco-
nomic activities’, not focus on any formal qualification, which can easily deviate 
from the economic reality.25
24 Some scholar advocates CIN as the fundamental rationale for the CCCTB Directive, ANDERS-
SON, K. An Optional Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the European Union. In: 
Andersson, K., Eberhartinger, E., Oxelheim, L. (eds.). National Tax Policy in Europe: To Be or 
Not to Be? Berlin: Springer, 2007, p. 86–90. 
25 As to focusing on the reality instead of form in the company law, this has been long recognized 
by EU legislators. For example, in 1992 the European Commission’s Ruding Report on the 
direction of European company tax reform, also refers this as “neutrality of legal form”, to 
require equal treatment between subsidiaries and permanent establishment. Ruding report uses 
the term ‘neutrality’ also in a narrow sense. The full text of Ruding report, see the archive: 
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To take into account the fairness/inter-nation equity between EU Member 
States in the context of the EU law, the neutrality principle should incorporate 
the benefit principle and the subsidiarity principle. The benefit principle26 and the 
subsidiarity principle are both important principles that support and reserve Mem-
ber States’ fiscal autonomy and diversity. The benefit principle plays an important 
role in the development of tax law although it does not seem to have a status the 
general principle of EU law. As Brooks analyzes, corporations enjoy two sets 
of benefits that justify levying corporate income tax: the first type of benefit for 
shareholders, is the legal personality and limited liability of a corporation.27 Such 
legal privilege would enable shareholders to invest more freely, via a corporation. 
The second type of benefit is various ‘legal, social, and economic infrastructure 
to earn profits’ that that a corporation receives from the state, including health 
and qualified workforce, transportation and communication infrastructures, etc. 
Despite of theoretical objections, it is undeniable that these two types of benefits 
are actually enjoyed and provided to corporations in the modern market economy.
In the EU law regarding the field of personal direct taxation, the Court of 
Justice of European Union does not view personal direct tax as the price for 
a bundle of public goods, in the case Schumacker (Case C-279/93).28 However, 
the doctrine from the case Schumacker does not preclude the benefit principle 
from applying to the corporate income tax. In fact, the Court of Justice seems 
to decide its cases regarding Member States’ treaty laws in line with the benefit 
principle: the Court rejects the most favorable treatment principle applied in the 
field of tax law, and recognizes the disparity of withholding tax rate of different 
Member States. In other words, EU Member States have no obligation to adopt 
the minimum withholding tax rate among all Member States. As Englisch’s 
analysis on the case law Schumacker demonstrates, the benefit principle is the 
cornerstone supporting Member States’ fiscal autonomy and thus this principle 
is indirectly reflected in CJEU’s jurisprudence.29
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0044caf0-58ff-4be6-bc06-be2
af6610870/language-en, accessed 8 August 8 2018
26 Discussions regarding the origin of the benefit theory, see COOPER, G. The Benefit Theory of 
Taxation. Australian Tax Forum, 1994, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 397–509. A more recent discussion, see 
STEWART, M. The Tax State, Benefit and Legitimacy, The Tax State, Benefit and Legitimacy, 
Tax and Transfer Working Paper No. 1/2015, (2015) [online]. Available at: https://taxpolicy.
crawford.anu.edu.au/publication/ttpi-working-papers/7567/tax-state-benefit-and-legitimacy
27 BROOKS, K. Learning to Live with an Imperfect Tax: A Defence of the Corporate Tax, 36, 
University of British Columbia Law Review, 2003, vol. 36, no. 3, p. 621–672.
28 Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker, European Court Reports 1995 
I-00225, ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:1995:31.
29 ENGLISCH, J. Tax Coordination between Member States in the EU – Role of the ECJ. In: 
LANG, M. et al. (eds.). Horizontal Tax Coordination, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2012, p. 3–22. 
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The rationale of the benefit principle is clear: in order to provide public 
benefits, levying taxation is justified, including corporate tax.30 In the field of 
international tax law, the (reformed) benefit principle justifies the allocation of 
a taxable income between the source state and residence state.31The benefits are 
no longer understood as a specific public service, but a more general idea as ‘pub-
lic goods’, including education, health and even ‘re-distribution’ can be seen as 
a type of ‘public good’.32 In the formulary apportionment discussions, the benefit 
principle is adopted as a reason to justify the sales factor, labour factor, and the 
asset factor, because the benefit principle also describe the ‘relation’ between 
these factors and the involved states, because these factors are the indicators of 
public benefits being provided.33
By taking into account the benefit principle, the neutrality principle will not 
use a ‘no-tax world’ as the optimal or perfect world. Instead, the tax neutrality 
principle for EU Member States should make the “market” functioning well, 
which also includes the tax levied for the costs of providing the good public 
services. Tax levied to provide public service that can enhance taxpayers’ produc-
tivity, is not ‘neutral’ from the no-tax baseline; however, from the perspective of 
efficiency, the very origin of neutrality principle, levying tax to provide sufficient 
public service, is desirable and even closer to the ideal status of neutrality. For ex-
ample, Hasen reconsiders34 the presumption of no-tax baseline for the neutrality 
30 The opposite argument that the benefit principle cannot justify corporate tax: see DODGE, J. M. 
Does the ‘New Benefit Principle’ (or the ‘Partnership Theory’) of Income Taxation Mandate an 
Income Tax at Both the Individual and Corporate Levels?’ FSU College of Law, Public Law Re-
search Paper No. 118 (August 2004). [online]. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.571826
31 The benefit principle plays an important role the international tax law in the beginning of the 
early 20th century, see the introduction by L. J. Global Profit Split – An Evolutionary Approach 
to International Income Allocation. Canadian Tax Journal, 2002, vol. 50, no. 3, p. 823–883; 
Other scholars argue that, the benefit principle in the international tax law is actually a fail-
ure. See FLEMING, J. C., PERONI, R. J., SHAY, S. Fairness in International Taxation: The 
Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income. Florida Tax Review, 2001, vol. 5, no. 4, 
p. 299–354, at p. 334; More recently Avi-Yonah and xu also argue, the current way that the 
benefit principle applied to international tax law is already outdated and can no longer properly 
allocate international active and passive income earned in a digitalized world. They argue for 
a reverse application of the benefit principle, i.e. active income to the source jurisdiction and 
passive income to the residence jurisdiction. I do not fully agree with their conclusion, but I agree 
with them that the benefit principle should also be reformed. See AVI-YONAH, R. S., xU, H. 
Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits Principle and Proposal for UN Oversight. 
Harvard Business Law Review, 2016 vol. 6 no. 2, p. 185–238.
32 See note 26, Miranda Stewart.
33 MAYER, S. Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market. Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009, p.1–
354, p. 21. 
34 HASEN, D. M. Tax Neutrality and Tax Amenities. Florida Tax Review, 2012, vol. 12, no. 2, 
p. 57–125.
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principle, but opts to the baseline which takes into account the taxation covering 
public revenues.35 Another scholar, Knoll also casts doubts on this presumption 
of no-tax “ideal” world. To pursue the fairness and the benefit principle between 
EU Member States via a large-scale harmonization as CCCTB, the no-tax world 
should not be the hypothetically perfect world or the base line.
As to evaluate the boundary between EU and Member States’ competence, the 
subsidiarity principle plays an essential role, when we formulate tax neutrality 
under the EU law for evaluating the CCCTB Directive. As Portuese36 analyzes, 
the subsidiarity principle in essence, is a principle of economic efficiency. The 
EU value-added test to evaluate the subsidiarity, as the impact guideline indicates, 
is a test of ‘efficiency’. EU should intervene only when the net benefits are larger 
than Member States’ actions could convey. The test of necessity (Portuese uses 
the term ‘the sufficiency test’), is the test of effectiveness. Portuese argues that, 
the subsidiarity is criticized for its vagueness, but this vagueness is actually 
essential for such principle to deal with weighting difference economic con-
sequences. Both decentralization (keeping fiscal autonomy) and centralization 
(harmonization) can use the subsidiarity principle to justify themselves. In the 
context of CCCTB, the subsidiarity principle would be achieved when harmo-
nization and maintaining diversity are balanced: EU will harmonize the tax base 
and the sharing formula whereas Member States will decide the actual amount 
of taxation by setting their own CCCTB tax rate.
To sum up, the neutrality principle that CCCTB endorses is a trio-formula-
tion: pursuing the efficiency that takes into account the benefits principle and the 
subsidiarity principle. It is intriguing that such trio-formulation coincides with 
Richard Musgrave’s formulation of three functions of taxation: macro-economy 
stabilization, re-distribution, and resource allocation.37 Richard Musgrave argues 
that the functions of macro-economy stabilization and re-distribution should 
be assigned to the central-government level and the function of resource allo-
cation should be assign to sub-national government level. The trio-formulation 
35 Ibid., Hasen redefines taxation that can enhance taxpayers’ product-ability as ‘tax amenities’.
36 See note 21, Aurelien Portuese.
37 Scholars have elaborated based on Richard Musgrave’s early work on these three functions. See 
McLURE Ch. E, MARTINEZ-VAZQUEZ, J. The Assignment of Revenues and Expenditures 
in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations (The World Bank Institute 2000). [online]. Available at: 
https://gsdrc.org/document-library/the-assignment-of-revenues-and-expenditures-in-intergovern-
mental-fiscal-relations/
The original work, see MUSGRAVE, R. A. The Theory of Public Finance. New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1959, p. 1–628. Peggy Musgrave explains again that this three-branch model is the 
normative idea but does not necessarily match the reality, since the reality is far more complex. 
See MUSGRAVE, P. B. Comments on two Musgravian concepts. Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 2008, vol. 32, no. 4, p. 340–347.
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neutrality coincides with Musgrave’s idea of delineation of competence between 
central and sub-national governments. In the case of CCCTB more precisely, 
the scope of the group tax base and taxing powers division are decided by EU 
level, i.e. the Directive, but the tax rate, i.e. the exact tax burden occurs in each 
Member State is decided by Member States. Richard Musgrave’s three func-
tions of taxation also coincides with CCCTB’s multiple purposes, including to 
establish a business-friendly internal market (coinciding with macro-economy 
stabilization function), combating BEPS problems and ensuring MNE taxpay-
ers’ economic activities to relate to where they are actually occurred (related 
to with redistribution function). Since CCCTB still keeps the Member States’ 
competence to decide the corporate tax rate, it also preserves Member States’ 
competence of ‘allocating resources’.
2.3. Neutrality Is Not Identical As Intra-Nation Equity
As indicated above, I argue that, CCCTB should be evaluated against the neutral-
ity principle that also includes the benefit principle and the subsidiarity principle, 
and thus the baseline of the neutrality is not a no-tax world, but a world that 
sufficiently public goods are provided to achieve the internal market, imple-
mented by each Member State that can into account their diversity and maintain 
‘healthy’ tax competition. In the context of international tax law as well as the 
domestic tax law, scholars have started to use the ‘new benefit principle’38 that 
benefits are not understood as specific benefits offered or received but should 
be understood as ‘all relevant public goods maintaining a market’ and I endorse 
the benefit principle in the broad sense. Different states provide different public 
benefits in the EU internal market, and thus it is justified for Member States to 
have fiscal autonomy to decide the size of the public revenue and expenditure, 
via a democratic process. It seems that, inter-national equity and healthy tax 
completion between Member States would exist
Here comes the basic question: why do we not start from the inter-nation equity, 
but from the neutrality and broaden it? Putting it differently, is it still logical to dis-
cuss the neutrality principle as the main normative framework when the distinction 
between the neutrality and equity is inevitably blurred in the context of establishing 
an internal market of EU? My answer is affirmative: it is still logical and necessary 
to start from the neutrality and extends its borderline to ‘inter-nation equity’ or 
38 The new benefit principle is analyzed by DODGE, J. M. Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations 
on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles. Tax Law Review, 2005, vol. 58, no. 4, 
p. 399–461. In this paper Dodge also discussed Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s argument 
in tax and justice. It should be noted that Dodge does not agree with this new benefit principle, 
though he agrees with Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s he anti-Libertarian objective.
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fairness, but not the other way around, even though I do recognize the fundamental 
importance of the subsidiarity and fiscal autonomy of EU Member States.
The reason is: CCCTB is a harmonization effort from EU internal market 
perspective; whereas inter-nation equity, developed by Peggy Musgrave and 
other economists, is the norm of pursing fairness between ‘fully’ sovereign states. 
EU Member States, even though they are still sovereign, have the obligation 
not to hinder the functioning of the internal market but to facilitate the internal 
market. Any EU law harmonization to pursue the internal market, should be 
evaluated from the efficiency perspective. Pursuing the neutrality toward the 
optimal status of the internal market, is still the primary norm. While designing 
any EU law in line with the neutrality norm, it is equally important to ensure 
that different EU Member States’ taxing powers are divided/allocated fairly and 
Member States maintain their diversities and healthy tax competition. Therefore, 
while acknowledging that the tax neutrality principle under the EU law is in part 
overlapping with the inter-nation equity, these two principles are neither identical 
nor interchangeable.
3. Philosophical Theories As CCCTB’s Justification: 
A Thought Experiment
3.1. The Disputes of the existence of ‘Global Tax Justice’  
and the Corporate Tax incidence Issue
Section 3 will discuss the second main part of this paper: exploring philosophical 
theories regarding tax, applying these ideas to the CCCTB Proposal and exam-
ining if the CCCTB Directive us justified. Before exploring the application of 
well-accepted philosophical theories to CCCTB as part of EU law, we need to 
be aware of a discussion gap of ‘global tax justice’ or ‘regional tax justice’ in the 
context of European Union. Some scholars embrace the concept of ‘global tax 
justice’39 whereas some are skeptical.40 Although I am of the opinion with the 
supporters that global tax justice does/should exist as a norm, this is not a trivial 
consensus but arguable as follows.
As to the first dispute, EU is not a sovereign state itself but it has suprana-
tional feature and EU law with direct effect. It is true that, until now European 
39 For example, POGGE, T., MEHTA, K. (eds.). Global Tax Fairness, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016, p.1–384.
40 For example NAGEL, T. The Problem of Global Justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2005, 
vol. 33, no. 2, p. 113–147. 
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Union does not levy its own direct tax from individuals or companies. There-
fore, the traditional political philosophies may confront some difficulties when 
we try to use these theories to evaluate a supranational taxation system such as 
CCCTB Directive. Most political philosophies mainly describe justice as the 
ideal relation between individuals and a single sovereign state, not the relation 
between individuals and international organizations as such EU. In my view, it 
is still reasonable to apply these philosophies to EU corporate tax law context 
and I also believe that ‘regional justice’ or ‘global justice’ is an appropriate tool 
to evaluate EU tax laws. The theories from political philosophers do not neces-
sarily prefer a specific tax type or tax base, but they will provide an underlying 
rationale that describes the ideal relationship between states and taxpayers. What 
we cannot deny is that, quite a lot EU law instruments have direct effect upon 
taxpayers. European Union has provided quite a few rights that are directly ap-
plicable to citizens, including free movements of goods, workers, service, capital 
and freedom of establishment. Each fundamental freedom is a right that a single 
EU citizen can invoke against Member States.
As to the second dispute on the actual burden of the corporate tax, corporate 
tax is levied upon corporations but the tax burden of corporate tax will be borne 
by other natural persons, such as shareholders or employees. Traditionally, it is 
believed that shareholders of corporations will bear the corporate tax.41 Some 
scholars have started to argue that42, employees of the companies will be the 
ultimate people who bear the corporate tax incidence.43 But more recent studies 
also show that the corporate tax incidence is not necessarily significantly em-
ployees’ burden.44 Besides, when the corporate income taxation on cross-border 
activities in the manner of formulary apportionment, some economists like Mc-
Lure argue that the factors of the formula will also lead to tax incidence effect, 
so customers, employees and immobile capital owners will de facto bear the 
corporate tax incidence.
41 For example Dodge reiterates this, see note 38.
42 This seems the mainstream view currently. The academic literature review on the tax incidence, 
see FUEST, C. Who bears the burden of corporate income taxation? ETPF Policy Paper, no.1, 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) (2015) [online]. Available at: http://www.etpf.
org/papers/PP001CorpTax.pdf
43 The economic incidence of corporate tax law is a difficult issue without consensus since early. 
See note 27 Kim Brooks, at p. 632. She cited an early academic discussion that demonstrates 
the difficulty for lawyers, see KLEIN, W. A. The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: 
A Lawyer’s View of a Problem in Economics. Wisconsin Law Review, 1965, vol. 1965, no. 3, 
p. 576–605.
44 The new empirical data showing the opposite conclusion to the mainstream theory of corporate 
tax incidence, see CLAUSING, K. A. In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence. Tax Law Review, 
2012, vol. 65, no. 3, p. 433–672. 
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Corporate tax incidence is indeed born by natural persons, but empirically 
it is not clear who ultimately or significantly bear the burden. It is also possi-
ble that, shareholders, employees, investors, customers, all bear corporate tax 
incidence respectively, but we are not sure exactly to what extent.45 Despite 
of the tax incidence issue, it is well accepted that effectively paying corporate 
taxation at least should not create obvious inequality to the society.46 Aggressive 
tax planning scenarios by multinational taxpayers mentioned by OECD’s Base 
Erosion& Profit Shifting reports have revealed that the corporate income tax that 
multinationals have paid, is far from sufficient, so multinationals are accused of 
creating further inequalities. In my view, the current lawful-looking but aggres-
sive tax planning scenarios from corporate taxation, have created inequalities 
from two aspects: for one, creating inequality to other market competitors who 
do not conduct such tax planning; for the other, creating individuals who do 
not invest as corporate shareholders. Therefore, to negate corporate income tax 
completely, by arguing the actual corporate tax burden/tax incidence being by 
customers and employees, seems to overlook the function of the corporate tax. 
It might be accepted that, due to the possible tax incidence effects, corporate 
taxation should not be the ‘only measure’ to pursue re-distribution, but the tax 
incidence effects should not be the main reason to negate corporate taxation 
completely either. In Section 4 of this paper I will go back the presumption tax 
incidence effect of corporate tax to evaluate the weighting factor selection the 
CCCTB Directive.
Briefly speaking, I am of the opinion that it still makes sense to adopt the 
philosophical justice concept to conduct the thought experiment to examine 
the current CCCTB Directive Proposal, though these political philosophers’ 
original work has not yet discussed justification of corporate taxation at the 
international or the regional level. The following sections will discuss differ-
ent theories and examine if the CCCTB Directive Proposal in general and its 
several policy options are in line with these philosophical criterion of ‘jus-
tice’ and the reasoning. I will discuss John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Liam 
Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s work respectively. As to the existence of the 
CCCTB Directive Proposal in general, they might have different reasoning 
45 For example, Clausing also indicates the complexity to model corporate tax and thus it is not 
definitive yet to draw conclusions on corporate tax incidence, Ibid. Moreover, there are also 
data showing that corporate tax incidence is on customers. See SALLEE, J. M. The Surprising 
Incidence of Tax Credits for the Toyota Prius. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 
2011, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 189–219. 
46 The phenomenon of ‘paying merely small amount of tax’ has been recognized as the evidence 
of inequalities caused by the various planning scenarios embedded in the current (international) 
corporate tax systems, see PIKETTY, T. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 2017, p. 1–93, Ch. 16.
NEUTRALITY AS TAx JUSTICE: THE CASE OF COMMON CONSOLIDATED 
51
from their perspectives but would come to the same conclusion to justify the 
CCCTB. But as to the specific policy options in the CCCTB, they would have 
different judgments.
3.2. Liberalism: John Rawls’ Basic Liberty Principle  
and Difference Principle
John Rawls is one of the representing philosophers of liberalism. Rawls’ theory 
of justice has established two principles of justice. The fist principle is ‘the liberty 
principle’, which means state should ensure that citizens have political liberty 
equally. The second principle is the ‘difference principle’, which means that 
inequality in law can only be allowed when such inequality is for the purpose 
of re-distribution from the better-off to the worse-off. Briefly speaking, Rawls 
embraces ‘equality of opportunity’ and heavily emphasizes ‘redistribution’ as 
justice. A state should guarantee equality of opportunity to individuals to realize 
their own talents and choices in a free-competition market.
What Rawls demands for a tax system of justice,47 should ensure the indi-
vidual’s basic rights and liberties to be exercised freely and equally; and a tax 
system should also be capable of conducting some re-distribution. Here arise 
two fundamental questions under Rawls’ theory when it comes to the EU law: 
(1) are EU treaty fundamental freedoms, such as free movement of workers, ser-
vices, freedom of establishment ‘qualified’ as basic rights and liberties as Rawls 
mentioned? (2) If the previous answer is affirmative, do legal persons, such as 
companies also enjoy the EU treaty freedoms as the same as natural persons, 
according to Rawls’ justice criterion?
These two answers are both affirmative in my view. Rawls’ ‘basic rights and 
liberties’ include a set of political and economic rights. As De Boer48 analyzed, 
EU treaty freedoms are in fact qualified as fundamental rights in Rawls’ idea, 
not because these treaty freedoms are extended from property rights, but because 
these treaty freedoms will ensure ‘equality of opportunity’ and free market access 
of market participants in the EU. Furthermore, companies are conglomeration 
of real people‘s interest, so ensuring ‘equality of opportunity’ of companies will 
also ensure ‘equality of opportunity’ of real people.49
47 SUGIN, L. Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls Demands 
from Tax Systems. Fordham Law Review, 2004, vol. 72, no. 5, p. 1991–2014. 
48 De Boer argues that EU treaty freedoms are qualified as fundamental rights under Rawls’ first 
principle. See DE BOER, N. Fundamental Rights And The EU Internal Market: Just How Fun-
damental Are The EU Treaty Freedoms? A Normative Enquiry Based On John Rawls’ Political 
Philosophy. Utrecht Law Review, 2013, vol. 9 no. 1, p. 148–168. 
49 CJEU’s jurisprudence also confirms to such interpretation. Ibid., p. 156.
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Given that exercising EU treaty freedoms to pursue the internal market 
will promote ‘equality of opportunity’ according to Rawls’ justice theory, the 
CCCTB Directive Proposal that aims to facilitate companies to exercise their 
treaty freedoms and conduct cross-border activities, is in line with Rawls’ ‘first 
principle of justice’. A harmonized corporate group taxation at the EU law level 
is justified, though CCCTB as such is not a measure to conduct re-distribution 
effectively. A corporate tax system in any case, should not be designed as allow 
the inequalities persist.
3.3. The Libertarianism: Robert Nozick’s Minimal State 
And The Strict Benefit Principle
Rober Nozick is one representative philosopher of libertarianism. Nozick em-
braces the idea of a minimal state and thus he argues that taxation (and public 
service) should be minimum, limited to the extent of providing the necessary 
public service that only the government could provide. Nozick’s most well-
known and provocative argument is that levying taxation is equivalent to ‘forced 
labour’50 because individuals have to work more than they need, in order pay 
tax. In Nozick’s view, when the government is the only institution capable of 
providing such public service and citizens give consent to it, the government is 
justified. In Nozick’s view, taxation is the payment for specific public service. 
In other words, the benefit principle in the strict sense that views taxation as the 
payment to the public service, is the core concept of Nozick’s theory.
A lot of types of tax would still be compatible with libertarianism’s benefit 
principle, including the income tax.51 The strict benefit principle will focus on 
the minimal state and minimal public service; when there are not sufficient link 
between public service and taxation levied, such taxation would be defined as 
injustice under the strict benefit principle.
CCCTB as such, does not seem to relate a specific public service to the MNE 
taxpayers. However, we can also argue that the broader sense of ‘benefit’ that 
establishes and improves the EU internal market, adopting CCCTB will provide 
extra benefit to economic operators in the EU to have more extended freedom 
of establishment and free movement of service, such benefit can justify CCCTB 
itself. The most direct benefits that the CCCTB will provide, is ‘cross-border 
loss-offsetting mechanism’ and the one-stop shop administrative mechanism. 
These ‘new’ benefits should justify the adoption of the CCCTB Directive.
50 NOZICK, R. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974, p. 1–357.
51 BIRD-POLLAN, J. The Philosophical Foundations of Wealth Transfer Taxation. In: Bhandari 
M. (eds.). Philosophical Foundations of Tax Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 
p. 217–232.
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Since Nozick endorses the minimal state, he would argue that after adopting 
the CCCTB Directive the tax burden should not be heavier than the companies 
already pay to Member States.52 In fact, the European Commission’s empirical 
simulation research has showed that MNE taxpayers would not bear heavier tax 
burden if the CCCTB is adopted, because the European Commission predict 
revenue reduction for several Member States,53 and MNE taxpayers can reduce 
largely compliance costs.54 Furthermore, the CCCTB harmonizes corporate tax 
that is already levied by Member States, not adds an extra new type of tax. The 
subjective application scope of the CCCTB is strictly defined in line with com-
panies that already have been subject to corporate tax law of EU Member States.55 
The CCCTB would just replace current bilateral tax treaties between Member 
States. Generally speaking, adopting the CCCTB Directive based on the scope 
of national corporate tax law, should be consistent with the minimal state idea. 
Harmonization at EU level as well as setting a one-stop-shop mechanism is also 
consistent with the idea of a minimal state, because reducing disparities of na-
tional laws of each Member State could also streamline administrative and com-
pliance burdens, such as filing different tax returns in different Member States. 
Therefore, it is justified, in Nozick’s view to adopt CCCTB system, provided 
that such system does not create extra burden or let governments of Member 
States expand too much. That said, when CCCTB is designed as a harmonization 
measure effectively reducing tax law disparities and compliance burden, Nozick 
would not be negative about such system.
3.4. The Pre-tax Income as Myth Theory:  
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s book ‘The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and 
Justice’ has provided another view on taxation and justice. Murphy and Nagel 
52 The opposite view, see BARRY, N. The Rationale of the Minimal State (2004). [online]. Available 
at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923x.2004.619_1.x Barry argued that Nozick would be against 
international organizations such as EU, because such creating supranational organization is ‘not 
resurgence of individualism and economic liberty but a new form of statism’. Put it differently, 
Barry interpreted Nozick’s minimal state would not endorse EU because according to Barry 
Nozick would see EU as another ‘big state’, not resulting in limiting EU member states. However, 
it is arguable.
53 Annex xII: The impact on tax revenues of Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assess-
ment Accompanying the document Proposals for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate 
Tax Base and a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB){COM(2016) 683 final} 
{SWD(2016) 342 final}.
54 Ibid., Annex VII: Compliance Costs.
55 See Article 2 of CCTB Directive Proposal and Annex 1 and Annex 2.
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negates ‘everyday libertarianism’ derived from Nozick56 and provocatively ar-
gues that, the natural right on pre-tax income is a myth, because taxation is es-
sential for the state to provide public goods and earning income is based on the 
environment with sufficient public goods. Nozick’s minimal state for Murphy 
and Nagel is ‘too minimal’57 and not sufficient. In other words, without taxation 
or such public goods, earning any pre-tax income is just impossible. Therefore, 
instead of regarding pre-tax income should be owned by taxpayers, Murphy and 
Nagel argue that, taxpayers cannot claim 100% of the pre-tax income, and the 
state has the legitimacy to levy tax.
Murphy and Nagel especially endorse the outcome of the free ‘market’, be-
cause such outcome reflects personal choices and responsibilities.58Murphy and 
Nagel argue strongly that, a well-functioning market requires comprehensive 
legislation and government services from all aspects, such as anti-trust legisla-
tion, the monetary policy, the transportation policy, etc.59 Therefore taxation and 
government are just essential to establish a market. Since the CCCTB Directive 
Proposal is based on pursuing the internal market, Murphy and Nagel would 
recognize this justification to adopt the CCCTB Directive too.
4. Policy Options From The Different Philosophies’ 
Perspective
4.1. The Different Attitudes to the Tax Rate Competition
As indicated above, the CCCTB system in the general sense would be justified 
by Rawls, Nozick, Murphy and Nagel’s theories. However, when it comes to 
specific policy options, these philosophers might have different conclusions. 
One distinctive feature of the CCCTB Directive is that tax rate competition is 
still possible and even encouraged. After harmonizing the tax base, Member 
States can still set their own statutory corporate tax rate. In other words, tax rate 
differentials are a given fact and are not seen as non-neutral or injustice under 
the CCCTB Directive Proposal. In other words, tax rate competition is ‘neutral’ 
for the European Commission.
Rawls would have a different judgment on the tax rate competition and the 
risk of race to the bottom. Rawls’ justice theory argues that, a minimum social 
need for every individual is necessary. If tax rate competition leads to race to the 
56 Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, at p. 31 (note 2).
57 Ibid., 182.
58 Ibid., 66.
59 Ibid., p. 32–33.
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bottom and thus insufficient public service provision, such system is not justice. 
Rawls would support a healthy tax competition under coordination. Therefore, 
to set up a minimum tax rate for CCCTB, in order to prevent race to the bottom 
and secure the minimum social need.
Nozick argues for a minimal state, and tend to see taxation as payment of 
specific public service. Therefore, Nozick would be in favor of tax competition in 
general. In case of tax rate competition to the bottom, Nozick would regard such 
competition as justified, when such tax competition will drive different states 
to reduce their tax rate, downsize the public expenditure and provide the most 
‘cost-efficient’ public service. Nozick might also support that there is a maximum 
tax rate set in the CCCTB Directive to prevent Member States ‘racing to the top’.60
According to Liam Murphy and Nagel’s tax justice theory, they would be 
negative about tax rate competition. According to Murphy and Nagel’s theory, 
taxpayers earn their ‘pre-tax income’ because they have made use various public 
goods provided by the government, and therefore the natural rights to ‘pre-tax 
income’ is a myth. In this regard, sufficient provision of public goods61 is so im-
portant in Murphy and Nagel’s justice concept; Murphy and Nagel will definitely 
be negative about the possible risk of ‘race to the bottom’.
4.2. Formula Apportionment
4.2.1. The Status Quo of CCCTB’s Formula: The Sales Factor,  
the Labour Factor, the Asset Factor
In addition to harmonizing the tax base, CCCTB has another feature: it is a for-
mulary apportionment system. CCCTB allocates Member States’ taxing powers 
by apportioning the MNE taxpayer’s consolidated tax base according to the 
sales factor, the asset factor and the labour factor that are attributed to each 
group member. Each factor is weighted equally as one-third. The three-factor 
formula had been widely used in USA’s state taxation practice.62 The European 
60 Although it looks impossible, according to Pethig and Wagner’s empirical data, adopting the sales 
factor in the formula could have the possibility for Member States to race to set a higher tax rate 
than the optimal one. See PETHIG, R., WAGENER, A. Profit Tax Competition and Formula 
Apportionment. CESifo Working Paper Series no. 1011 (August 2003) [online]. Available at: 
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1011.pdf
61 Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, at p. 140 (note 2).
62 The overview of the formulary apportionment state taxation in USA, see WEINER, J. M. Com-
pany Tax Reform in the European Union: Guidance from the United States and Canada on 
Implementing Formulary Apportionment in the EU. Berlin: Springer, 2006, p. 1–122. Joann 
Martens Weiner’s research is an important reference of the European Commission’s CCCTB 
working group. She affirms the three-factor formula later. See WEINER, J. M. CCCTB and 
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Commission has taken this practice and followed several experts’ advice, to adopt 
the three-factor formula.63
Nowadays, more and more tax scholars are arguing that a formula should 
consist of only the sales factor, because the sales factor is (claimed to be) harder 
to be manipulated. They argue that the labour factor and the asset factor are 
under taxpayers’ control and thus easier to be manipulated, but even in a high 
jurisdiction taxpayers will still sell as much as possible and they cannot really 
control their customers.64 As to the CCCTB Directive, there are some similar 
discussions65 to favor the single sales factor formula. Despite of criticisms and 
doubts66, the single sales factor formula has become quite popular in states of 
USA. Regarding the philosophers’ ideas of justice we discuss, however, these 
philosophers might endorse that the formula consists multiple different factors, 
because the single sales factor formula might not fulfill their justice concepts 
because it only presents the very limited (though still important) aspect of the 
market economy: the consumption side.
In the following sections, I will further discuss the asset factor, the sales factor 
and the labour factor respectively from each philosopher’s main concept. How-
ever, in each philosophy’s perspective, they have different justifications to the 
current formula under the CCCTB Directive Proposal. To ensure the discussions 
comprehensive, I will discuss two different presumptions: the first presumption 
of companies’ shareholders bearing the corporate tax; the second presumption 
that the actual tax burden is in fact on a formula’s weighting factors, argued by 
the prominent economist McLure67 and others.68 Different philosophers would 
Formulary Apportionment: The European Commission Finds the Right Formula. In: Weber, D. 
(eds.). CCCTB: Selected Issues. Alphen aan de Rijn: Kluwer, 2012.
63 European Commission, CCCTB’ Working document No. 60 [online]. Available at: https://ec.eum-
ropa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/docs/body/ccctbwp060_en.pdf
64 The widely cited work, see AVI-YONAH, R. S., CLAUSING, K. A. Reforming Corporate 
Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, The Hamilton 
Project Discussion Paper (2007) [online]. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/ren-
forming-corporate-taxation-in-a-global-economy-a-proposal-to-adopt-formulary-apportionment
65 For example, LLOPIS, E. L. Formulary Apportionment in the European Union. Intertax, 2017, 
vol. 45, no. 10, p. 631–641.
66 GRUBERT, H. Destination-based income taxes: A mismatch made in heaven. Tax Law Review, 
2015, vol. 69, no. 2, p. 43–72.
67 MCLURE, C. E. The illusive incidence of the corporate income tax: The state case. Public 
Finance Quarterly, 1981, vol. 9, no. 4, p. 395–413. 
68 For example, GORDON, R., WILSON, J. D. An Examination Of Multi jurisdictional Corporate 
Income Taxation Under Formula Apportionment. Econometrica, 1986, vol. 54, no. 6, p. 1357–
1373; MIESZKOWSKI, P., MORGAN, J. The National Effects of Differential State Corporate 
Income Taxes on Multistate Corporations. In: McLure, Ch. E. (eds.). The State Corporation 
Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Taxation, Stanford Hoover Institution Press, 1984, 
p. 253–263.
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have different judgments on these weighting factors under different presump-
tions. I will discuss the asset factor, the labour factor and the sales factor in turn 
under these two presumptions.
4.2.2. Rawls’ Perspective About Factor Selection
Shareholders of Corporations Bearing The Tax burden:  
Three Factors Are All Justified
When we presume that shareholders of corporations bear the tax burden of the 
corporate income tax, the asset factor represents interests of jurisdiction where 
the assets are utilized. Rawls would be positive about the asset factor in the 
formula. Via corporations as a large-scale economic entities, their shareholders 
have the capacities to make use of more resources and thus own more assets 
than individuals.
When we assume shareholders of corporations bearing the ultimate burden, 
the labour factor represent the human resources that corporations make use of. 
Rawls would be positive about the labour factor in the sharing formula, because 
the jurisdiction where employees are located, would maintain a labour market 
that employees compete with each other and corporations can choose the most 
suitable employees. Rawls would also be positive about the sales factor in the 
formula. It should be noted that Rawls might not be very interested in the single 
sales factor formula, because although the single sales factor formula will only 
focus on the demand side of the market. Furthermore, the difference principle 
that endorses redistribution function will not be achieved.
Presumption of The Tax Incidence Effect On Factors:  
Only The Asset Factor And The Sales Factor Are Justified
However, when we preseume that the tax incidence effect of the payroll factor, 
there would be different reasoning. Rawls would be negative about the labour 
factor, because in the end of the say, it is immobile employees bearing the burden, 
so the labour factor cannot fulfill the purpose of re-distribution.
Rawls would be still positive about include the asset factor in the formula. 
The effect of including the asset factor in the formula is to putting tax incidence 
on capital owners. Since Rawls emphasizes the function of re-distribution, tax 
incidence on capital owners would actually fulfill the res-distribution function 
of the taxation.
Furthermore, according to Mclure’s claim, adopting the sales factor of the 
sharing formula has the tax incidence effect on consumers. In Rawls’ opinion of 
pursing re-distribution, he would support the sales factor in the formula. Rawls 
EUROPEAN STUDIES – VOLUME 5/2018
58
has clearly expressed that his support to consumption tax. Due to Rawls’ support 
to the consumption tax, Rawls would be very interested in a single sales factor 
formula, because a single sales factor formula would be equivalent to a type of 
sales tax, if we presume Mclure claim as true.
4.2.3. Nozick’s Perspective about Factor Selection
Shareholders of Corporations Bearing The Tax burden:  
Three Factors Are All Justified
Generally speaking, Nozick would be negative about any tax burden levied on 
assets, because he believes in the natural right on the asset. However, in case 
of corporate income tax that is presumed to be born by companies, he would 
be positive about the asset factor in the formula, because sovereign states, via 
a corporation law system as such, provide more benefits to companies than indi-
viduals: a company has its own legal personality so its shareholders can separate 
the asset of corporations from their personal assets. Companies have limited 
liability and enhanced creditability in the market economy. This is a benefit 
that an individual business persons could not enjoy. Besides, Nozick would be 
also positive about the labour factor. Nozick would accept that the government 
provides public service, such as education, so the quality of labour is guaranteed. 
Shareholders can hire qualified employees via their corporations to conduct all 
the economic activities. Nozick would be also positive about the sales factor, 
based on his view of minimal state and the strict benefits principle. The state 
provides a competitive market for corporations to provide their goods and ser-
vice to their customers. ‘Regulating the market’ has been recognized as a type 
of public service, even in a libertarian’s view.69
Presumption Of The Tax Incidence Effect On Factors:  
Only The Sales Factor Is Justified
Nozick’s judgment would be quite different, if we accept the tax incidence effect 
of the asset factor according to Mclure’s claim. Nozick would be immediately 
negative about have the asset factor in the formula, because he is in general quite 
negative about levying tax upon assets. Therefore, if including the asset factor in 
the formula has the same tax incidence effect on the capital owner, Nozick would 
not endorse the asset factor because the capital owners of the corporations would 
be the one carrying tax burden. Nozick would see the asset factor as restriction to 
capital owners to make use of their own money. Nozick would be also negative 
69 See note 51 Jennifer BIRD-POLLAN.
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about the labour factor under the tax incidence effect either, because Nozick has 
been always critical about wages tax and sees such tax as being limitation to 
personal freedoms.
Under the tax incidence effect presumption, Nozick would be also positive 
about the sales factor even if the actual tax burden is actually consumers. The 
regulation of the market has been recognized as a type of public service, and such 
regulation would apply to both customers as well as companies, and thus even 
if the sales factor would have the tax incidence on customers, the sales factor is 
justified because it relates to the public service of ‘regulating a market’.
This reasoning of ‘regulating the market’ as a type of public service might 
sound a bit counter Nozick. We might have presumed that Nozick could have 
argued that with the tax burden, consumers cannot freely make their own choices 
to purchase and customers would never be able to give their consent to such tax 
burden, because it is an invisible one resulting from the tax incidence effect. 
However, it is important to note that, Nozick‘s core concept is a ‘minimal state’, 
not a pure anarchy nor a ‘no state’. Therefore, if the result of ‘regulating the 
market’ has streamlined the government and grants more freedom for individuals, 
Nozick would still support such regulation.
4.2.4. Liam Murphy And Thomas Nagel’s Perspective
Shareholders Of Corporations Bearing The Tax Burden:  
Three Factors Are All Justified
When we assume shareholders bear the corporate tax burden, Murphy and Nagel 
would also be positive about the asset factor in the sharing formula. In their view, 
the so-called pre-tax income is actually the result guaranteed by the government, 
and therefore it is justified for a state where corporations make use of their assets 
to conduct business, to levy corporate tax based on their assets.
With the similar rationale, Murphy& Nagel would be positive about the la-
bour factor. In Murphy& Nagel’s view, it would be justified to levy corporate 
tax based on corporate taxpayers’ employees, because the state provides the 
education system to ensure employees’ quality, for example.
Murphy& Nagel would be affirmative to include the sales factor in the for-
mula, because the sales represent directly the result of the market.70 Corporations 
make use of the consumer’s market to make profits and thus it is justified to 
choose the sales factor in the formula.
70 See note 66 Liam MURPHY and Thomas NAGEL.
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Tax Incidence Of Factors Is Not The Main Concern Of Murphy 
& Nagel: Three Factors Are Justified
It should be noted that, Murphy and Nagel have been aware of the possibility 
of shifting corporate tax incidence to labour, but they argue that tax incidence 
is not the main concern of justice, but the ‘social outcome’.71 This is a main 
difference from Rawls and Nozick’s thoughts. Therefore, for Murphy and Na-
gel, justification of levying a type of tax does not rely on the real tax incidence. 
In Murphy& Nagel’s view, they would be also positive about the asset factor 
and the sales factor in the formula as well. Murphy& Nagel would still be 
positive about the labour factor in the formula even if the tax incidence effect 
on the immobile employees. As long as the government can achieve a fair so-
cial outcome, no matter the tax incidence effect falls on immobile employees, 
capital owners, or customers, it will not influence the justification of levying 
corporate tax.
4.2.5. Summary Of Three School Of Thoughts
It is clear that, a three-factor formula would be justified based on three schools 
of philosophies above, i.e. Rawls, Nozick, Murphy and Nagel, when we presume 
that shareholders are the real entities bearing the tax burden as the most tradi-
tional view. Even the classical libertarian Robert Nozick would be affirmative 
to a three-factor formula.
However, when we also take into account the tax incidence effect argument of 
the formula factors, the tax burden of corporate income tax, these philosophers’ 
attitudes towards the labour factor and the asset factor would not be always the 
same. From Rawls’ perspective, if corporations bear tax burden themselves, 
Rawls would be positive about the labour factor because corporation tax based 
on employees is consistent with his re-distribution concept: taxing the better-off 
who can have extra capital to invest and hire other people. When the corporate tax 
incidence is in fact on employees due to adopting the labour factor in the formula, 
Rawls would be skeptical to the labour factor, because the tax incidence effect 
on employees’ payroll is contrary to the re-distribution objective of taxation. 
From Nozick’s view, when taking into account the tax incidence effect, Nozick 
would be negative about the asset factor, because the tax incidence effect would 
be falling on owners of immobile assets. This would be contrary to Nozick’s 
conclusion if we presume shareholders bearing the tax burden and enjoy the 
benefits of limited liability and separating the assets of corporations and the 
assets of shareholders. Nozick would also be negative about the labour factor 
71 Ibid., 131.
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if the tax incidence falls on employees. Being quite different from Nozick and 
Rawls, Murphy and Nagel express that the tax incidence effect will not influence 
their judgment on tax justice, so from their philosophical view, the three factor 
formula will be still accepted.
It seems to me that, the neutrality derived from the CCCTB Directive, is the 
middle way of these three schools of philosophical thoughts. As to the tax rate 
competition, CCCTB Directive allows the tax rate competition between EU 
Member States, and Nozick would immediately accept this position, because it 
is consistent with Nozick’s minimal state rationale. Rawls and Murphy& Nagel 
would be more concerned about the problem of ‘race to the bottom’ issue than 
Nozick. As to the formulary apportionment, the neutrality of CCCTB seems 
consistent with Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagels’ idea of tax justice,72 especially 
when the benefits principle is interpreted broadly as ‘providing the pre-condition’ 
of the market economy, not to require the causal link of a specific benefit received 
or provided. Therefore, the CCCTB Directive Proposal adopts three weighting 
factors that reflect different economic activities from the production side to 
the customers side. The CCCTB Directive Proposal does not seem to take into 
account Mclure’s well-known claim of the tax incidence effect of the formulary 
apportionment, because it refers these weighting factors as the indicators of 
‘where the companies’ profits are actually earned’.
5. Conclusion: Toward A Broad-Sensed Tax 
Neutrality As Tax Justice
The neutrality principle that regulates the EU tax law harmonization is trio-for-
mulation: efficiency, the benefits principle and the subsidiarity principle. The 
baseline of evaluating the neutrality should not be the hypothetical non-tax world, 
but a well-functioning market that tax contributes to build up. The trio-formu-
lation of neutrality is also suitable to regulate the competence division between 
Member States and EU, and it accepts the very existence of shared competence, 
such as pursuing an internal market. In the context of EU tax law that aims ‘to 
establish a market’, the neutrality norm and inter-nation equity will converge; 
CIN and CEN will also be achieved at the same time.
Intra-nation equity and tri-formulation neutrality cannot be separated, so the 
norm of neutrality is understood as broadly. In this regard, the broad-sensed 
72 It should be noted that Murphy and Nagel have expressed that their doubts regarding the classical 
meaning of benefit principle, though. Ibid., p. 31, under the subtitle of ‘The Problem of Everyday 
Libertarianism’.
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neutrality principle is partially overlapping with the scope of the ‘justice’ con-
cept that has been long argued and discussed by political philosophers. Since 
the very existence of government relies on tax collection, whether a tax system 
is ‘neutral’, is also the core question of ‘whether the government levies a tax as 
such is justified’. Most philosophers are not tax law scholars, and focus more 
on ‘social justice’ instead of tax justice, and thus they rarely discuss in detail on 
justification of a specific type of tax or specific policy options. Even they touch 
upon the tax, philosophers usually only discuss taxes levied upon individuals, 
not corporations. Therefore, the discussions above contribute to bridge the gap 
between these theories and the idea of tax neutrality.
While applying Rawls’ liberalism, Nozick’s libertarianism, and Murphy and 
Nagel’s ownership myth and tax justice theory to analyze different aspects of 
CCCTB as if doing the thought experiments, I draw the conclusions as follows: 
based on these three schools of thoughts, CCCTB as a corporate taxation system 
at the EU law level, is justified. The tax rate competition under the CCCTB 
that possibly leads to ‘race to the bottom’ would not be accepted by Rawls and 
Murphy& Nagel’s theory. Nozick would be more comfortable with the tax rate 
competition. As to justifications to the formulary apportionment method, when 
we presume the corporations as the real entity bearing the tax burden, that is the 
shareholders who make use of the form of the corporation to conduct business, 
three school of thoughts would all be positive about the three-factor formula 
which consists of the sales factor, the asset factor and the labour factor.
I have to admit that there are unsolved puzzles when it comes to the tax 
incidence effect of formulary apportionment argued by many economists. This 
presumed effect seems to make the philosophical reasoning murky. Nozick would 
be negative about the labour factor and the asset factor, because these two factors 
will make the corporate taxation as de facto payroll tax and asset tax, and owners 
of immobile properties and immobile employees will bear the actual burden. 
Such tax incidence effect is contrary to Nozick’s basic belief that individuals’ 
liberty should prevail other policy objectives. Rawls would also be negative about 
the labour factor, because the tax incidence effect will shit burden to immobile 
employees, and this seems directly contrary to Rawls’ re-distributive justice. 
What still intrigues me is that, tax incidence effect of formulary apportionment 
and corporate tax, has been widely discussed but there is never a clear consensus 
even between economists. So I tend to be cautious about the policy implications 
derived from the claims on ‘who de facto bears the corporate tax burden’, es-
pecially in the formulary apportionment context, although this is still a puzzle 
for me. Therefore, being similar to Murphy and Nagel, I am of the opinion that 
the justification of a specific tax policy option is not based on the tax incidence 
effect, but the overall outcome after levying such tax.
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Finally, while embracing the neutrality that takes into account ‘inter-nation 
equity, when it comes to BEPS, aggressive planning, and tax avoidance concerns, 
I am cautious about the arguments of directly naming, shaming, and blaming 
MNE taxpayers. In other words, I do not see these problems as MNE taxpayers’ 
‘fault’, but a systematic failure of the current international corporate tax system, 
which is deviating from the tax neutrality. MNE are active economic actors in 
the market and can create employments and stimulate better production and 
consumption. I am also cautious about the current harmful tax competition claim 
that argues for a harmonized tax rate, because even in an integrated market, not 
every part of the market (i.e. every Member State) is homogeneous. Keeping 
diversity of EU Member States and freedom to compete is the opportunity to 
develop the most suitable public service from Member States. The neutrality 
principle in the broad sense, taking into account the benefit principle and the 
subsidiarity principle, would be a more appropriate norm of tax justice, to guide 
a supranational system such as CCCTB that involves interactions between MNE 
taxpayers, EU and Member States.
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